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I. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
The genesis of this appeal is from a Magistrate Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law Re: Petition for Allowance of Claim in an Estate case. The Magistrate's decision was appealed 
to the District Court. The District Court subsequently affirmed the Magistrate's decision in its Order 
on Appeal. This appeal was subsequently filed. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS/STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Almon Manes died on February 10, 2009. T. Jesse Miller (hereafter "Miller") was appointed 
personal representative. 
Shortly before Almon Manes' death Miller asked Dan Samson (hereafter "Samson") to help 
her deal with the Estate property. The underlying issue in this case is not whether or not Samson 
provided services for the Estate, the issue is what type of compensation Samson is entitled to for his 
efforts. 
The testimony in the record is that Miller offered compensation to Samson in the form of 
personal property of the Estate. Samson testified that he told Miller he wanted money but Miller did 
not agree, and instead told Samson that he would be well compensated. 
Subsequently, in May of 2009, Samson was presented a Property Management Agreement 
that was signed by Miller. This Agreement specifically stated that Samson "shall, at no time under 
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any circumstance, receive any monetary reimbursement for his services" and also provided a detailed 
list of the personal property that he was to receive for compensation for his services. 
Samson never talked to or agreed with Miller about a hourly rate. See Tr. pg. 182 lns. 17-24. 
Samson provided services for the Estate on his own free will. See Tr. pg. 184 lns. 22-23. 
In September of 2009, Samson was relieved of his duties by Miller. 
On October 14 of2009, Samson mailed a bill for labor to Miller. Samson does not remember 
if he sent Miller one before that date. See Tr. pg. 183 lns. 18-23. 
Samson filed a claim against the Estate of Almon D. Manes. Said claim was denied by 
Miller. Samson subsequently filed a petition for allowance of claim. Said claim was heard and the 
parties submitted oral and written closing arguments. On May 26, 2011, the Magistrate Court issued 
its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Re: Petition for Allowance of Claim. Miller 
subsequently filed a motion to reconsider and after denial, an appeal was timely filed with the 
District Court. The District Court subsequently affirmed the Magistrate's decision in its Order on 
Appeal. This appeal was subsequently filed. 
II. 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Did the Trial Court error when it determined the parties did not have an express 
contract based on performance? 
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2. Did the Trial Court err by finding that a implied-in-fact contract existed between the 
parties. 
3. Did the Trial Court err in granting quantum meruit relief when said theory was not 
argued for by Samson. 
4. Did the Trial Court err in granting damages when no evidence was presented at trial 
regarding reasonable value of services. 
III 
ARGUMENT 
A. The Trial Court Erred by Finding That the Parties Did Not Have a Express Contract 
Based on Performance. 
The Trial Court found that there was an oral agreement and understanding between the 
parties but no express oral or written contract. Miller respectfully disagrees with this finding. 
In May of 2009, Samson was presented a Property Management Agreement that was signed 
by Miller. This Agreement specifically stated that Samson "shall, at no time under any circumstance, 
receive any monetary reimbursement for his services" and also provided a detailed list of the 
personal property that he was to receive for compensation for his services. 
At trial, Samson went through and testified about all of the obligations in the Agreement that 
he performed. Samson argued that performance could establish, or bind a party, without a signature. 
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I think there's an argument to be made that the agreement was binding because it was 
followed through; and, therefore, you don't need the signature. You can imply that 
the agreement was completed just from both parties performing. 
See Tr. pg. 150, lns. 12-16. 
While the Trial Court found that Samson and Miller had an oral agreement and understanding 
it also found that they did not enter into an express contract and the work that Samson performed 
was not pursuant to an express contract, oral or written. With regards to the Agreement, the Trial 
Court did not find and conclude that there was a meeting of the minds regarding the terms and 
provisions set forth therein, or that Samson agreed to the terms and provisions therein. 
This holding does not make any sense. The Trial Court states that the parties had an oral 
agreement but that the work by Samson was not performed to an express contract, oral or written. 
The Court finds that there is a oral agreement but not an oral contract. You cannot have one without 
the other. 
The evidence in the record is in not in dispute that Miller told Samson that he would not be 
compensated with money. While Samson testified that he told Miller he wanted money, Miller did 
not agree, and instead told Samson that he would be well compensated. The Court found that 
Samson and Miller never reached a specific and express agreement as to how Samson would be 
compensated. However, as set forth above Samson put on evidence and argued his performance of 
the Agreement. 
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Miller respectfully contends that the evidence at trial supports a finding that the Agreement 
and its terms is binding based on performance as argued by Samson. The Court erred by finding that 
there was not a meeting of the minds with regards to the Agreement because the evidence established 
that he performed under the Agreement. His performance of the terms of the Agreement is the 
meeting of the minds. The Court's subsequent finding of quantum meruit is thus also in error 
because of the existence of the Agreement between the parties. Equity does not intervene when an 
express contract prescribes the right to compensation. See Vanderford Company, Inc. v. Knudson, 
144 Idaho 547, 558,165 P.3d 261,272 (2007). 
As such, Miller respectfully contends that the Trial Court's decision be reversed and 
remanded back with instructions that the Agreement is the binding contract between the parties. 
Neither the Trial Court nor the District Court addressed the issue of performance. 
B. The Trial Court Erred by Finding That a Implied-in-fact Contract Existed Between the 
Parties. 
The Trial Court found that the parties did not have a meeting of the minds with regards to 
the Agreement, however, it found that a contract implied-in-fact existed between the parties. 
Implied-in-fact contracts are "dependent on mutual agreement or consent, and on the intention of the 
parties; and a meeting of the minds is required." 17 C.J. S. Contracts § 6(b) at 422. Miller contends 
that the Trial Court's finding on this issue is in error and should be reversed. 
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As set forth above, a meeting of the minds is required for a implied-in-fact contract to be 
found between parties. The evidence in the record is in not in dispute that Miller told Samson that 
he would not be compensated with money. While Samson testified that he told Miller he wanted 
money, Miller did not agree and instead told Samson that he would be well compensated. The Trial 
Court found that Samson and Miller never reached a specific and express agreement as to how 
Samson would be compensated. The District Court found that based on the evidence that the Trial 
Court properly found that the parties never had a meeting of the minds with respect to the method 
of paying compensation. See Record, pg. 131. 
This is not a matter in which the parties did not discuss monetary compensation or even 
disagree on a rate of monetary compensation. This is a matter where Miller consistently stated that 
monetary compensation would not be paid. Clearly the parties never had a meeting of the minds at 
any point regarding the manner of compensation. 
Quantum meruit is the appropriate recovery under a contract implied-in-fact. Barry v. Pac. 
W Const., Inc., 140 Idaho 827, 834, 103 P.3d 440, 447 (2004). As set forth above, a contract 
implied-in-fact requires a meeting of the minds and in this case a meeting of the minds did not exist 
with respect to the method of paying compensation. Thus, a implied-in-fact contract cannot exist 
between the parties and a quantum meruit recovery is not available to Samson in this case. 
Both the Trial Court and the District Court failed to address the issue of implied-in-fact 
contracts requiring a meeting of the minds. However both the Trial Court and the District Court 
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held that a meeting of the minds regarding the manner of compensation did not occur between the 
parties. As such, as a matter of law, no implied-in-fact contract can exist between the parties and 
Samson is not entitled to recovery under quantum meruit. Miller respectfully requests that the Trial 
Court's decision and District Court's affirmation on this issue be reversed and remanded back with 
instructions vacating the award to Samson on the basis of an implied-in-fact contract and quantum 
meruit. 
C. The Trial Court Erred in Granting Quantum Meruit Relief When Said Theory Was 
Not Argued for by Samson. 
While the Magistrate Court found the work by Samson was not performed to an express 
contract, oral or written and denied Samson's claim for unjust enrichment based on lack of proof, 
the Trial Court did award Samson monetary compensation based on the theory of quantum meruit. 
At oral closings, Samson argued that he was entitled to relief based either on an agreement between 
the parties or under the theory of unjust enrichment. In his written closing and rebuttal brief, Samson 
argued that he was entitled to relief based on an agreement between the parties or under the theory 
of unjust enrichment. At no time did Samson argue for quantum meruit. Samson did not pursue 
quantum meruit during trial and written closings. Samson pursued damages through contract or 
unjust enrichment theories. The Trial Court has no authority to order that Samson is entitled to 
damages under the doctrine of quantum meruit when it was not pursued by Samson. Quantum 
meruit and unjust enrichment are two different theories based on two different kinds of implied 
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contracts with two different measures of damages. Samson argued that there was either a contract 
formed in February of 2009 or that unjust emichment applies. This Court found that no express 
contract existed and that there was not sufficient proof at trial to support unjust emichment. Those 
are the only two theories that Samson pursued and those are the only two theories that he should be 
entitled to recover under. 
The Trial Court noted that Miller did not address quantum meruit in her briefing. Obviously 
this is because she is not required to because it was not argued by Samson. With all due respect to 
the Trial Court it cannot find that quantum meruit applies to this case because it was not pursued by 
Samson. A court does not have the authority to do this. When a court looks for claims or remedies 
outside of the pleadings and the arguments it no longer is impartial to both parties; its clearly 
favoring one party over the other. Miller was extremely prejudiced by the Trial Court's decision 
to award damages to Samson that had not been pursued by Samson. As such, Miller respectfully 
requests that the Trial Court's decision and the District Court's affirmation of this issue be reversed. 
D. No Evidence Was Presented at Trial Regarding Reasonable Value of Services. 
For a quantum meruit claim the measure of recovery is the reasonable value of services 
rendered. Erickson v. Flynn, 138 Idaho 430, 434-435, 64 P.3d 959, 963-964 (2002). The plaintiff 
carries the burden of proof. Id. 
The Trial Court awarded damages based on an hourly rate of $20 multiplied by a number of 
hours. At no time during the trial did Samson ever put on any evidence that $20 an hour was a 
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reasonable rate for the services he provided. Several other witnesses testified about what they were 
paid but none of these witnesses ever gave an opinion as to whether or not $20 an hour was a 
reasonable rate for the services provided by Samson. Samson himself did not testify that he thought 
$20 was a reasonable rate. In fact, in reviewing the transcript there is no testimony whatsoever in 
which any witness ever mentioned, let alone discussed, the rate of $20 per hour. Samson never 
testified to the Court that he was requesting $20. The same argument is also true with regards to the 
number of hours Samson allegedly worked. None of the witnesses testified that the number of hours 
was reasonable. Samson himself did not even testify as to the exact number of hours that he was 
requesting compensation. 
Samson had the burden of proof to establish the hourly rate and number of hours was 
reasonable. He failed to do this. The Trial Court's decision to award $20 an hour based on the 
number of hours it did is not supported by any evidence in the record. As such, the Trial Court's 
decision on this issue should be reversed for failure of adequate proof. 
The District Court, in addressing this issue, said that it considered Exhibits 9A, 15, and 17-
32. The District Court should not have considered these exhibits with regards to the issue of whether 
or not $20 an hour was a reasonable value for the services that he rendered. Exhibit 9A was a letter 
that Samson allegedly sent regular and certified mail to Miller. There was never any testimony as 
to its contents and whether or not the $20 an hour was a reasonable value for services rendered. The 
fact that the letter was sent does not establish that $20 an hour was a reasonable value for services 
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rendered. Exhibit 15 was only admitted for illustrative purposes and was never used during trial by 
Samson. Again there was never any testimony whether or not $20 an hour was a reasonable value 
for services rendered. Exhibits 17-32 are not relevant to the issue of whether or not $20 an hour was 
a reasonable value for the services that Samson allegedly rendered. Miller respectfully requests that 
the Trial Court's decision and District Court's affirmation on this issue be reversed. 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
Samson performed under the Agreement and argued for its enforceability. The only 
enforceable contract, whether it be express or implied, is the Agreement based on performance as 
argued by Samson. 
The parties never had a meeting of the mind with regards to compensation. This is the only 
conclusion that can be reached from the evidence presented. As such, as a matter of law, the Trial 
Court erred in finding, and the District Court erred in affirming, that an implied-in-fact contract 
existed between the parties. 
Samson never argued quantum meruit. The Court does not have the authority to fashion a 
claim and a remedy that was not pursued by Samson. Miller was extremely prejudiced by the Trial 
Court's decision to award damages to Samson that had not been pursued by Samson. 
Samson failed to present sufficient evidence with regards to the reasonable value of services 
rendered. 
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Based on the foregoing, Miller respectfully requests that the Trial Court's decisions, and the 
District Court's affirmation, in this matter be reversed as set forth above. 
DATED This 3rd day of August, 2012. 
CLARK AND FEENEY 
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I hereby certify that on the day of August, 2012, I caused to be served a true and correct 
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Thomas J. Clark 
Attorney at Law 
PO Box 1901 







Via First Class Mail 
By Hand Delivery 
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By E-mail 
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